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THE SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL 
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT* 
In commenting on a congressional debate, the late Mo Udall is reputed to 
have remarked, "Everything that needs to be said has been said, but everybody 
hasn't said it."' It is tempting to think this sentiment aptly characterizes the 
state of discourse on President Clinton's impeachment proceedings. Through-
out the Clinton impeachment proceedings, dozens of commentators in various 
fora opined on the central question of whether the President's misconduct 
constituted an impeachable offense. In offering their opinions on this issue, 
commentators squeezed as much meaning as they possibly could from the 
meager sources of authority. Such sources included the framers' and ratifiers' 
sparse debates about the standard for impeachment and removal (including no 
explicit consideration of whether misconduct without a direct link to a 
President's official duties may constitute an impeachable offense );2 the limited 
range of reasonable inferences from the constitutional structure about the 
relationship among the electoral process, impeachment, and the President's 
misconduct (particularly in the aftermath of changes wrought by the Twelfth 
and Seventeenth Amendments and subsequent electoral reforms);3 and 
precedent (consisting of only three serious impeachment efforts previously 
undertaken against Presidents and a total of only sixteen impeachments ever 
formally initiated by the Houser The hearings uncovered no new evidence 
from conventional sources on the constitutional standard for presidential 
Copyright© 2000 by MichaelJ. Gerhardt 
This comment is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/63LCPGerhardt. 
*Visiting Professor of Law, Duke University, Spring 2000; Professor of Law, William & Mary. 
I am very grateful for the constructive comments and suggestions of my fellow participants on 
the panel examining the significance of President Clinton's impeachment and trial. 
1. The Cost Implications and Benefits to the United States of the Proposed First Round of NATO 
Expansion, Hearing Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, FED. NEWS SERV, Oct. 21, 1997 
(statement of Senator Dale Bumpers) (quoting Mo Udall). 
2. For a general discussion of the framers' and ratifiers' debates about the scope of impeachable 
offenses, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 3-21 (2d ed. 2000). 
3. See infra note 44. 
4. The three previous Presidents who were the subjects of impeachment attempts were John Tyler 
(subjected more than once to unsuccessful impeachment inquiries directed against his exuberant 
exercises of his veto and appointments authority); Andrew Johnson (impeached, but not removed, for 
firing his Secretary of War in arguable violation of the Tenure in Office Act, which required Senate 
approval for a President to remove an officer who had been previously confirmed by the Senate); and 
Richard Nixon (forced to resign from office after the House Judiciary Committee approved three 
impeachment articles against him). 
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impeachment, though the evidence adduced was twisted in just about every 
conceivable way. 
Nevertheless, the present symposium features some creative and 
constructive thinking about President Clinton's impeachment and trial. At the 
very least, each participant recognizes that in the aftermath of the President's 
acquittal, a whole new battle is being waged to shape subsequent generations' 
understanding of the significance of his impeachment and trial. Each 
participant has a different perspective on the ramifications of the acquittal, 
especially on the lessons that one can derive from the proceedings. 
My concern is with the implications of several distinctive features of the 
constitutional structure for Professors Katyal's and Bloch's articles,5 as well as 
for general understanding of the federal impeachment process. The first such 
feature of the constitutional allocation of power for impeachment and removal 
is that it facilitates and rewards a pragmatic or flexible analysis and impedes a 
formalistic analysis of the fundamental question at the core of President 
Clinton's impeachment proceedings-whether his misconduct constituted a 
"high Crime or Misdemeanor."6 A pragmatic analysis of this issue entails 
balancing various practical considerations or factors, including the magnitude of 
harm that an impeachable official's misconduct has caused society or the 
constitutional order, the nexus between an official's duties and his misconduct, 
public opinion, and other possible avenues for redress, such as the electoral 
process or legal proceedings. In contrast, a formalist analysis employs rigid 
criteria for, or extremely well-defined elements of, impeachable offenses, such 
as treating every violation of the federal criminal law or every breach of the 
public trust as justifying removal. 
By vesting the impeachment authority in the politically accountable 
authorities of the House and the Senate, the framers of the Constitution 
deliberately chose to leave the difficult questions of impeachment and removal 
in the hands of officials well versed in pragmatic decisionmaking. Members of 
Congress are pragmatists' who can· be expected to decide or resolve issues, 
including the appropriate tests, by recourse to practical, rather than formalist, 
calculations. In fact, members of Congress decide almost everything 
pragmatically, and decisions about impeachment and removal are no exception. 
The vesting of impeachment authority in political branches necessarily implies 
the discretion to take various factors, including possible consequences, into 
consideration in the course of exercising such authority. 7 
5. Neal Kumar Katyal, Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Winter/Spring 2000); Susan Low Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment: 
Judging the Institutions that Judged President Clinton, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Winter/Spring 
2000). 
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
7. Cf Impeachment Staff Inquiry, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Memorandum: Constitutional 
Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 4 (Feb. 20, 1974); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 780, at 252 (rev. ed. 1991): id. § 744, at 218; see also ALEX. 
SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 651, 676-77, 803 (1916); Albert Broderick, 
Citizens' Guide to Impeachment of a President: Problem Areas, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 205, 229-34 (1973); 
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No doubt, one relevant consideration to take into account is original 
understanding, but it is only a pertinent, rather than a determinative, factor. 
The political accountability of members of Congress confirms the aptness of 
Professor Katyal's insight that original understanding is less binding on 
members of Congress than on courts.8 The political accountability of 
representatives and senators ensures that in formulating pragmatic judgments 
on the impeachability of the President's misconduct, the members of Congress 
discount or defer to the original understanding to the extent that their political 
circumstances and calculations allow them to do so. Because original 
understanding hardly pointed to any clear answer on the impeachability of 
President Clinton's misconduct, several other factors, such as public sentiment, 
outweighed this consideration. 
It is, however, easy to see why a formalist rather than pragmatic analysis of 
the critical constitutional question attracted both those fighting for and against 
President Clinton's removal. The reason is that formalist analysis is designed to 
restrict or constrain the discretion of members of Congress. The constitutional 
standard for impeachment-"treason, bribery, and other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors"-is hardly self-defining. Like other vague standards, it invites 
decisionmakers to rely on their own personal values or political preferences in 
interpreting the meaning of the relevant constitutional language.9 Generally, 
standards do not constrain the discretion of decisionmakers nearly to the same 
extent as rules, and the more vague the standard, the less constraint. A vague 
standard, such as "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors," is certainly prone to 
this problem, and neither side in the impeachment controversy was inclined to 
allow members of Congress much latitude in determining the impeachability of 
the President's misconduct. Instead, the contending sides advocated strategies 
for interpreting the Constitution's impeachment standard designed to facilitate 
their preferred outcomes. 
For example, most of those arguing for the removal of the President 
essentially posited a strict liability notion of impeachment.10 In their view, every 
Keith E. Whittington, "High Crimes" After Clinton: Deciding What's Impeachable, POL'Y REV. 32-33 
(Feb. & Mar. 2000). ! 
8. See Katyal, supra note 5, at 170. 
9. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 118, 174 (1999). 
10. See, e.g., Background and History of Impeachment, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Nov. 9, 1998) (statement 
of Rep. Charles Canady) [hereinafter Hearings] ("[I]f the President is guilty of the offenses charged 
against him, he must be called to account under the Constitution for the commission of 'high crimes 
and misdemeanors."'): id. at 22 (statement of Rep. Asa Hutchinson) ("If we conclude that perjury was 
committed but we take no action, what will a future jury do when asked to uphold a law and find 
someone guilty of lying under oath?"); id. at 125 (statement of Professor Stephen Presser) ("While [the 
Constitution] gives you discretion to determine whether a particular act or series of acts amounts to 
grounds for impeachment, [it] requires you to move forward to impeach if you determine there are such 
acts." (emphasis in original)); id. at 253 (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley) ("The only thing that 
you can't do in a Madisonian system is grant an exception .... [Y]our function is to define conduct 
which we cannot tolerate under the Constitution. Conduct which is incompatible with the President's 
office .... Before this case I thought there was a bright line for Presidents. You can't commit crimes in 
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breach of trust constituted an impeachable offense, and the commission of an 
impeachment offense necessarily dictated removal, especially if committed by a 
President. 
Similarly, many of those defending President Clinton, particularly those who 
drafted the letter signed by more than 400 law professors," argued that a 
requisite or indispensable element of an impeachable offense was a nexus 
between an official's misconduct and his formal duties. They argued that only 
something as horrid as murder would constitute an exception to this basic 
standard.12 
We now know that both of these formalistic approaches were rejected in the 
Clinton impeachment proceedings. On the one hand, the strict liability notion 
of impeachment advocated by the President's critics was problematic for several 
reasons. First, strict liability has never driven the federal impeachment process. 
Though it has sometimes explained particular votes cast for the impeachment 
and removal of some officials (for example, in each of the three judicial 
impeachment proceedings in the 1980S13), it fails to explain the relative dearth of 
impeachment attempts or removals. If this approach had, in fact, guided the 
impeachment process, the nation would have had many more impeachments 
and removals than it has had. Moreover, if formalist reasoning were the norm 
in impeachment proceedings, many questions posed by the President's 
misconduct would not have been nearly as heart-wrenching or politically 
divisive as they were. Removal would have been remarkably easy and 
straightforward. In addition, the American people flatly rejected the strict 
liability notion of impeachment; most Americans acknowledged that the 
President had broken the law, but still did not regard his misconduct as 
constituting an impeachable offense or as justifying his removal. 14 Most 
office."); see also POSNER, supra note 9, at 171 (arguing that the "fanaticism" of President Clinton's 
attackers blinded them to the ·practical consequences of their "mantra" that "no man is above the law, 
no felony should go unpunished, prosecutorial excess should not mitigate a defendant's punishment, 
but instead should result in two punishments (of the defendant and the prosecutor), and expediency 
should have no weight in the decision" whether to impeach the President). 
11. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 374-83 (reprinting letter dated November 6, 1998, signed by 
more than 400 law professors). 
12. See id. at 375. 
13. For a thorough discussion of the successful impeachments of Harry Claiborne, Alcee Hastings, 
and Walter Nixon in the 1980s, see ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES AND MISFORTUNES: 
THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 289-333 (1992); MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL 
IMPEACHMENT: NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE (1993). It is noteworthy that even though Claiborne had 
been convicted and imprisoned for income-tax fraud before his impeachment, the Senate explicitly 
rejected giving preclusive effect to prior felony convictions or to the evidentiary or factual findings 
underlying such judgments. See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 42-43. Though the Senate later convicted 
and removed Claiborne for the same offense for which he had been criminally convicted, most senators 
recognized the necessity for the Senate to undertake its own separate fact-finding and formulate its own 
judgments about the burden of proof and the facts to maintain the integrity, independence, and 
credibility of the Senate removal process. Such independence derived, in effect, from the recognition 
that the ultimate judgment on removal is driven not by the rigid application of strict liability, but rather 
the exercise of discretion based on senators' individual judgment about facts, applicable burdens of 
proof, national welfare, and removal standards. 
14. See Josh Getlin, The Truce Behind the Culture Wars; Values: Shrill Clinton Debate Drowns Out 
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Americans favored a less rigid approach that balanced the harm and 
wrongfulness of the President's misconduct against the public interest or 
welfare.15 
On the other hand, the formalist arguments of the President's defenders 
fared no better. A good example of the futility of such arguments is reflected in 
the reasoning of the law professors' letter.16 The gist of its argument was that 
removal almost invariably required a nexus between an official's misconduct 
and his duties. Because there was no such clear nexus in the President's case, 
removal was not justified.17 The problem is, however, that several sources of 
decision indicate that the nexus requirement is not as absolute as the law 
professors maintained. To begin with, the nexus arguably was abandoned or 
loosened in the case of at least one federal judge, Harry Claiborne, whom the 
House impeached and the Senate removed from a federal district judgeship 
because he committed tax fraud. 18 One of the defenders of the professors' letter 
tried to sidestep this problem in his testimony before the House Subcommittee 
on the Constitution by maintaining that Presidents are entitled to a higher or 
different standard for removal than are federal judges.19 That argument, 
however, has never been formally or widely accepted in past proceedings, and it 
was not accepted in this proceeding.20 
In any event, the central argument of the law professors' letter began to lose 
force once its signatories conceded, as Professor Sunstein did in his testimony, 
that murder and rape were examples of unofficial conduct on which the House 
may impeach and the Senate may remove an official. 21 It is not entirely clear 
why rape, while horrific, justifies impeachment and removal more so than the 
serious felony of perjury, unless the physical violence and depravity associated 
with the former crime demonstrate much more clearly unfitness for office than 
the latter. It is also not clear whether or how many signatories to the law 
professors' letter would reject sexual harassment-in contrast with lying under 
oath about it-as another possible basis for impeachment and removal. If 
sexual harassment, along with murder and rape, constitutes an impeachable 
offense, it is no longer clear that a nexus between a President's duties and his 
misconduct is an indispensable element of an impeachable offense. Indeed, 
there is no bright line that separates perjury or obstruction of justice in a private 
Broad American Consensus on Most Issues, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at A1; Kenneth T. Wald et al., 
The Price of Victory, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 22, 1999, at 26. 
15. See Getlin, supra note 14; Wald, supra note 14. 
16. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 83-91 (written statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein). 
17. See id. at 375. 
18. One could. however. argue. as some commentators did. that there was a nexus between 
Claiborne's misconduct and his -duties as a federal district judge. The link was provided by the 
necessity that a federal trial judge have unquestioned integrity in order to do his job. Otherwise, he 
lacks the requisite moral authority to oversee criminal proceedings for others charged with the same or 
similar offenses. See id. at 55 (written statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt). 
19. See id. at 83-91 (written statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Impeaching the President, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (1998). 
20. See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 184. 
21. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 82. 
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matter from rape or sexual harassment as a basis for removing a President. The 
distinction that clarifies some of these misdeeds as impeachable and others as 
not is the product of a pragmatic balancing of relevant factors. 
A second distinctive feature of the constitutional structure that clearly has 
consequences for the quality and nature of congressional decisionmaking on 
impeachment is the unique nature of the impeachment procedure itself. 
Impeachment is the only realm of authority in which Congress is empowered to 
exercise power without any formal opportunity for another branch to check its 
actions or otherwise provide input formally, or ensure that Congress will take 
seriously its substantive views, including those on interpretative matters.22 The 
usual checks on congressional action-judicial review and presidential veto-
are unavailable in the impeachment context. Nor is impeachment like a treaty 
ratification or confirmation proceeding, m which some presidential 
participation or action is mandatory. 
One might imagine that the likely absence of judicial review or opportunity 
for presidential veto or participation might liberate members of Congress to do 
as they please in the impeachment context, but all available data is to the 
contrary. The data, including anecdotal evidence and the published statements 
of members of Congress, indicate that discretion, unbounded by the actions or 
feedback of other branches, inhibits, rather than liberates, members of 
Congress.23 The knowledge that there is no other branch with which to share 
responsibility or blame is sobering, to say the least. 
The weight of the responsibility entrusted to Congress in a presidential 
impeachment proceeding is made all the heavier because the Constitution 
requires a supermajority for removal. 24 As a practical matter, the supermajority 
requirement ensures that only in the most egregious cases will there be 
removals. Normally, one can expect partisanship to play a significant role in 
congressional deliberations, as it did in the Clinton impeachment proceedings. 
However, convincing more than two-thirds of the Senate to remove an official, 
particularly a President, requires a showing of misconduct that is so egregious 
and so clearly linked to his public duties-even of the official's exemplary moral 
duties-that the normal influence of partisanship is overcome. That the 
Constitution requires an extremely compelling case to overcome partisanship is 
22. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I {Bicameral and Presentment Clauses requiring both chambers 
of Congress and the President to participate in the lawmaking process); U.S. CONST. art II 
{Appointments Clause requiring the President to nominate, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
officers of the United States); id. (treaty ratification implicitly requiring presidential involvement in the 
drafting and execution of treaties and explicitly requiring supermajority approval by the Senate for 
ratification). 
23. See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 173 (reviewing all of the statements entered by senators into 
the Congressional Record in the aftermath of President Clinton's trial); see also WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE IMPEACHMENT TRIALS OF JUSTICE CHASE AND PRESIDENT 
JOHNSON 240-47 (1992) (reviewing the statements entered by senators into the Congressional Record 
in the aftermath of President Johnson's impeachment trial). 
24. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 3, cl. 6. 
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not a new insight.25 That the House Managers in President Clinton's case failed 
to make the requisite showing is beyond question. 
The fact that bipartisan support for President Clinton's removal was not 
achieved in his trial was not surprising. It had at least one significant variable 
that the seven cases in which the Senate has convicted and removed officials did 
not-a popularly elected President who was still popular during his 
impeachment.26 It also lacked other variables present in those cases, including a 
clearly severe injury to the constitutional order, a clear link between the offense 
alleged to that injury and to an official's formal duties, and a showing that the 
linkage among those three factors was so close that the official was left unable 
to continue to perform his duties.27 With these many distinguishing features, it 
is easy to explain an acquittal without having to conclude that the system is 
broken. 
The unique nature of the impeachment procedure provides further support 
for Professor Katyal's perception that members of Congress are not bound in 
the same manner or to the same degree as judges to adhere to original 
understanding.2s The absence of judicial review ensures, for example, that 
members of Congress are less concerned with how courts would second-guess 
congressional judgments on the critical questions, including methodological 
ones, than with the necessity of determining a scale on which members of 
Congress could agree that the President's misconduct could be legitimately 
measured (such as original understanding, public sentiment, or the likely 
judgment of history). 
The uniqueness of the impeachment context also raises questions about the 
appropriate basis on which to render normative judgment as to how well 
Congress performed or how well the system works. Professor Bloch offers 
some possible answers, including popular opinion and the consistency between 
the House's performance in President Clinton's impeachment proceedings and 
other impeachments triggered by external referrals. 29 Her appraisal turns on a 
recognition of the critical distinction between political and constitutional 
legitimacy.30 She does not claim that the House acted unconstitutionally in the 
course of impeaching the President but that it acted unwisely and without an 
adequate political warrant that subsequent generations are likely to accept as 
25. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 380-81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
Alexander Hamilton warned that impeachments would likely draw on, and perhaps even be motivated 
by, partisan feelings; hence, the supermajority requirement exists, in part, to prevent partisanship from 
being the sole or primary reason for removing a high-ranking official. The odds are that securing a 
supermajority to convict requires some members of the impeached official's party to cross over. In the 
absence of such cross-over, the odds favor acquittal. 
26. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 54-56 (testimony of Professor Michael Gerhardt) (reviewing the 
factual circumstances distinguishing all seven officials convicted and removed by the Senate from 
President Clinton). 
27. See id. 
28. See Katyal, supra note 5, at 170. 
29. See generally Bloch, supra note 5. at 148-54. 
30. See id. at 161-65. 
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legitimate.31 
There is little doubt that Professor Bloch is correct that the political 
legitimacy of an impeachment effort turns, in large part, on the quality and 
nature of the procedural choices made by the House and the Senate in the 
course of conducting impeachment proceedings. The more these choices 
appear to be expedient, partisan, or unfair, the greater the likelihood the 
proceedings will be tainted as biased or illegitimate. The critical questions are 
who will judge-and how will they judge-the ultimate political legitimacy of 
President Clinton's impeachment proceedings. The answer is that subsequent 
generations, including present and future members of Congress, will judge the 
political legitimacy of the proceedings by various means. 
One obvious basis on which subsequent generations can evaluate the 
Clinton impeachment proceedings is by the proceeding's consequences. To 
begin with, it is clear that the office of the presidency saved Andrew Johnson 
from removal in spite of his widespread unpopularity. In the end, Johnson was 
acquitted, at least in part, because enough senators feared the repercussions 
that a conviction would have had on the presidency.32 On the contrary, the 
office did not save Richard Nixon, partly because his conduct was widely 
regarded, both then and now, as constituting serious abuses of uniquely 
presidential trusts.33 In contrast, most senators who voted to acquit President 
Clinton explained that they did not perceive his misconduct as having a 
sufficiently public dimension or injury to warrant his removal from office.34 As 
such, his misconduct is similar to the income-tax fraud claim that most members 
of the House Judiciary Committee refused to make the basis of an 
impeachment article against Richard Nixon because it lacked a sufficiently 
public dimension or harm.35 That latter decision, coupled with Clinton's 
31. See id at 154. 
32. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 23. 
Whether Andrew Johnson should be removed from office, justly or unjustly, was 
comparatively of little consequence-but whether our government should be Mexicanized, 
and an example set which would surely, in the end, utterly overthrow our institutions, was a 
matter of vast consequence. To you and Mr. Grimes it is mainly due that impeachment has 
not become an ordinary means of changing the policy of the government by a violent removal 
of the executive. 
ld at 248 (quoting letter from Senator James Dixon to Senator Fessenden) (citation omitted in 
original). 
33. No member of Congress during the Clinton impeachment proceedings questioned the 
propriety of the impeachment attempt against President Nixon. It has come to stand as a paradigm of 
legitimate presidential impeachment. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 10, at 54-55 (testimony of 
Professor Michael Gerhardt). 
34. Of the 38 senators who published statements on their reasons for voting not guilty on both 
articles, more than half-28--explained that they did not regard the misconduct alleged in either article 
of impeachment approved by the House as constituting an impeachable offense. See Published 
Statements of Senators Akaka, Boxer, Biden, Breaux, Bryan, Cleland, Collins, Dorgan, Durbin, 
Graham, Harkin, Hollings, Jeffords, Johnson, Kennedy, Kerry, Kohl, Lincoln, Leahy, Levin, 
Lieberman, Mikulski, Moynihan, Reid, Sarbanes, Snowe, Wellstone, and Wyden (all released into the 
Congressional Record on February 12, 1999). 
35. See Hearings on the Impeachment of President Clinton Before the House Judiciary Comm, 105th 
Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL 846820 (statements of former Reps .. Elizabeth Holzman and 
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acquittal, likely signals that there is a zone of a President's private life that is 
largely immune to scrutiny in the federal impeachment process. 
President Clinton's acquittal raises the question whether Congress will ever 
have the resolve to investigate the misconduct of a President with high approval 
ratings.36 The congressional investigation into Watergate took more than two 
years before the "smoking gun"-the tapes of certain conversations in the 
White House-that led to President Nixon's resignation was discovered.37 The 
Clinton impeachment proceedings took roughly six months. As such, they were 
among the shortest in American history, with the shortest having been the 
impeachment proceedings against Andrew Johnson, which lasted roughly three 
months from start to finish. 38 Even so, the relative shortness of President 
Clinton's impeachment proceedings was too long for most people. While it is 
true that most people did not believe President Clinton's case merited his 
removal,39 some investigations might not uncover seriously problematic 
misconduct insofar as the public is concerned for some time. Future members 
of Congress might think twice before engaging in a relatively prolonged 
investigation of a President's misconduct, for fear that it might alienate the 
public. Consequently, it is possible that impeachment will be effective only for 
the kinds of misconduct that can galvanize the public to set aside its approval of 
a President's performance to support resignation or formal removal. Future 
senators might support removal only if they have direct evidence of very serious 
wrongdoing and unambiguous consensus in Congress and among the public on 
the gravity of such wrongdoing. 
Moreover, future members of Congress could well construe President 
Clinton's acquittal as casting doubt upon the House's initial judgment to 
impeach the President. Indeed, there have been similar failures in the past, 
most notably in the impeachment attempts against Associate Justice Samuel 
Chase and President Andrew Johnson. The majority votes cast in favor of 
convicting both officials did not preclude either one's impeachment from being 
viewed as lacking political legitimacy by subsequent generations and members 
of Congress. The acquittals of Johnson and Chase have each had the effect of 
dissuading subsequent members of Congress from initiating impeachments 
based on similar misconduct.40 These members have taken such postures partly 
because the outcomes in the trials of Chase and Johnson did not turn on 
disputes about the underlying facts.' 1 Virtually everyone at the times of those 
Robert Drinan) (noting that because it was personal rather than official misconduct, President Nixon's 
tax evasion was not impeachable). 
36. See generally POSNER, supra note 9, at 177, 183. 
37. See STANLEY KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 464, 
468,470,513-15,534-38, 543,555, 619 (1990). 
38. See BUSHNELL, supra note 13, at 293-301. 
39. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 185. 
40. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachments: The Grand Tour, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 433, 449-
51 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE IMPEACHMENT TRIALS OF 
JUSTICE CHASE AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON (1992)). 
41. See id. 
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impeachments agreed on the facts, but they disagreed over their significance. 
Unencumbered with the need to resolve factual disputes, subsequent members 
of Congress have been free to make their own assessments of the legal and 
constitutional significance of the facts, and thus of Johnson's and Chase's 
misconduct. They have concluded that the misconduct targeted in each 
impeachment did not warrant removal from office. 
By similar reasoning, the Clinton acquittal could be construed by 
subsequent representatives and senators as rejecting the House's judgment on 
the impeachability of the President's misconduct. First, the vote to impeach the 
President was, as it had been in Johnson's and Chase's cases, largely cast along 
party lines.42 There has been widespread subsequent perception that the 
proceedings generally were conducted and resolved largely on partisan 
grounds.43 Moreover, most people, including most members of Congress, do not 
disagree much about the underlying facts in President Clinton's case; they 
disagree largely over the legal significance of the facts. Subsequent members of 
Congress might conclude that if such misconduct did not merit a conviction in 
Clinton's case, it would be inconsistent or unfair to allow it to support a 
conviction in another case. In addition, subsequent members of Congress could 
conclude that if a majority vote by the Senate to convict Chase and Johnson 
could not save either official's impeachment from being regarded as 
illegitimate, the absence of a majority vote in the Senate for either 
impeachment article against President Clinton, coupled with other criticisms of 
it, could be viewed as a rounder rejection of the legitimacy of the House's case 
than were the Senate votes in the trials of Johnson and Chase.44 
42. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 111. 
43. See World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Feb 12, 1999) (indicating that 71% of 
those polled by ABC believed the Senate voted on the basis of partisan politics rather than the facts); 
Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1999) (indicating that 74% of Americans expected 
senators not to vote their consciences, but rather on the basis of partisan politics). 
44. This rejection could be construed consistently with the framers' expectation of the Senate's 
performing a unique balancing function. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 513 (1969) (suggesting the framers expected that the Senate "would function with more 
coolness, with more system, and more wisdom. than the popular branch," because its members would 
be drawn from the elite of society and because of its longer term and insulation from direct public 
pressure). One might respond to this assertion in at least two ways. One could argue that the balancing 
was achieved in President Clinton's trial only because of the uniform partisanship of the Democrats in 
opposing removaL It is, however, always possible in an impeachment trial that the Senators from a 
President's political party might be inclined to oppose his removaL This possibility, coupled with the 
constitutional requirement of supermajority support among the Senators for removal, makes it 
incumbent upon those seeking a President's removal to bring charges and otherwise make a case 
against him that could draw bipartisan support. In President Clinton's trial, the President's critics failed 
to do so. 
Another possible response to the claim that Senators performed a checking function in President 
Clinton's trial is that the framers' expectations regarding such a checking function might no longer be 
valid in light of the Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments. By reducing the importance of the 
electoral college to the election of a President, the Twelfth Amendment and other election reforms 
have helped transform the presidency into a popularly elected office. Moreover, the Seventeenth 
Amendment changed the system for selecting senators from election by their respective state 
legislatures to popular election in their respective states. The alterations effected by the Twelfth and 
Seventeenth Amendments, at the very least, have increased sensitivity in the impeachment process to 
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Whereas President Clinton's acquittal might make it more difficult for 
Congress to use impeachment against a popular President, it does underscore 
the greater vulnerability to impeachment and removal of those officials who 
lack a President's resources, such as recourse to the bully pulpit or public 
support. It is not inconceivable that an unpopular President, such as Andrew 
Johnson, might meet a different fate in an age in which the media constantly 
applies pressure to investigate a President's misconduct or actions that have 
made him unpopular, and in which daily polls dramatize a loss of popularity and 
increase in support for removal. In this circumstance, removal or resignation 
might be extremely likely. To date, the only instance like this occurred during 
the final days of Richard Nixon's presidency, when the public, for the first and 
only time during the Watergate investigation, expressed support for President 
Nixon's ouster based on information revealed in the Watergate tapes:s The 
dynamic is likely to be even more problematic for a federal judge, perhaps a 
Supreme Court justice, whose hearings are not likely to receive anything near 
the widespread media coverage that President Clinton's proceedings received, 
the outpouring of public support, or the opposition to the prolongation of 
hearings. In the absence of these factors, a federal judge or other low-profile 
official lacks the resources available to a President, particularly a popular one, 
in defending against political retaliation in the form of an impeachment. 
Lastly, one cannot evaluate the legitimacy of the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings without taking into account Niccolo Machiavelli's basic admonition 
that if one wants to be successful, all one has to do is to lower one's sights.46 
Many prominent commentators have denounced the President's impeachment 
as driven by the purely partisan desire of the House Republican leadership to 
remove the President from office:7 If that were the case, they obviously failed 
to achieve their objective. What if the Republican leadership or some of its 
leaders had a different objective? It is possible, for example, that their 
objective could have been to embarrass President Clinton or tarnish his legacy, 
to cultivate so-called "Clinton fatigue," and thereby increase the chances of a 
Republican's election to the presidency in the year 2000. If any of these were 
the electorate's opinions regarding the necessity for removal, the targeted President, and the 
representatives or senators who sit in judgment of him. 
The fact that the electoral process serves as a check against executive abuse of power is, however, 
not a strong argument for treating Presidents differently from judges. The problem with the argument 
is that there is no electoral check against a second-term President's misconduct because the 
Constitution does not allow a reelected President to serve a subsequent term. It is telling that the 
impeachment efforts undertaken against Presidents Nixon and Clinton arose in their second terms, 
when neither was any longer subject to being held accountable in an election. Under such 
circumstances, it is pointless to consider the electoral process as a check against abuse of power. Its 
only relevance, then, has to do with the extent to which the public might have ratified the President's 
misconduct in an intervening election. 
45. See KUTLER, supra note 37, at 531-32. 
46. See generally N!CCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (1515). 
47. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 7, at 29-32 (reviewing and criticizing arguments of some of 
President Clinton's most prominent defenders, including Professors Ronald Dworkin and Cass 
Sunstein). 
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the objective of at least some Republican leaders, their effort cannot yet be 
declared a failure. Indeed, if a Republican prevails in the next presidential 
election, one can expect that he, as well as other Republican leaders, will argue 
that his election vindicates the impeachment effort. They will argue that the 
election of a Republican to succeed President Clinton reflects not the public's 
reluctance to punish the Republicans for trying to remove President Clinton, 
but rather the opposite. This argument will have even more force if many or 
most House Republicans who voted to impeach the President win reelection. 
Consequently, it is too soon to say whether the House or Senate deserves a 
failing grade for its performance in the President's impeachment proceedings. 
The final grade will be rendered in the form of the judgment of history, but it 
behooves us to remember that the judgment of history tends to be pragmatic, 
rather than formalist, based on historians' and subsequent generations' (and 
Congresses') balancing of a wide variety of factors. Perhaps most importantly, 
we should not forget that, whether we like it or not, the balancing will be done, 
as it always is in the writing of the history of any given political or constitutional 
contest, by the victors rather than the losers. President Clinton no doubt won 
the battle, for he was acquitted (under circumstances in which his popularity 
remained steadily high), but the war between the forces that gave rise to the 
President's impeachment goes on. We do not know how or when (or, for that 
matter, if) the war will end. But only when it does will it be possible to identify 
the winners and for them to cast the Clinton impeachment proceedings into 
meaningful historical perspective. 
